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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Jesse Eugene Mann was convicted of trafficking in
marijuana and two misdemeanor offenses for driving without privileges and possession
of drug paraphernalia. Mr. Mann asserts two errors on appeal. First, he argues that the
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found in the search of a
rental car. Second, Mr. Mann argues that the district court erred by improperly
instructing the jury on one of the elements for the offense of possession of drug
paraphernalia.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Mann committed the crime of
trafficking in marijuana, a felony, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1)(B) (five to twentyfive pounds). (R., pp.12–13.) This allegation arose out of a traffic stop of a rental car
driven by Mr. Mann. (R., p.8.) Mr. Mann was arrested for driving without privileges, and
the police’s inventory search of the vehicle found marijuana and “a marijuana bong.”
(R., p.8.) The case was consolidated with ISP0314584, which contained two
misdemeanor citations for driving without privileges, in violation of I.C. § 18-8001, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A(1). (R., pp.11, 15.)
After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause and bound
Mr. Mann over to district court. (R., pp.27–29; see also R., pp.70–76 (Def.’s Ex. F,
preliminary hearing transcript).) The State filed an Information charging Mr. Mann with
trafficking

in

marijuana,

driving

without

privileges,

and

possession

of

drug

paraphernalia. (R., pp.34–35.) For possession of drug paraphernalia, the State charged:
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That the defendant, JESSE EUGENE MANN, on or about the 8th
day of February, 2015, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did use
and/or possess with the intent to use drug paraphernalia, to wit: a bong or
pipe used to introduce into the human body a controlled substance, all of
which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case
made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the People of the
State of Idaho.
(R., p.35.)
Mr. Mann filed a Motion and Memorandum to Suppress and Dismiss, arguing the
evidence found in the rental car must be suppressed because the police officer who
conducted the traffic stop did not have reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation and the
subsequent search did not fall under any exception to the warrant requirement.
(R., pp.46–55.) The State responded in opposition, including an argument that
Mr. Mann did not have standing1 to challenge the search of the rental car. (R., pp.85–
98.)
The district court held a hearing on the motion. (See generally Tr., p.7, L.1–p.64,
L.9; R., pp.99–102). The district court took up the issue of standing first. (Tr., p.7, L.7–
p.37, L.15.) Mr. Mann testified. (Tr., p.9, L.14–p.23, L.6.) The district court ruled
Mr. Mann did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car, which was
rented by his “living as married” partner of five years, Ashley Cheney. (Tr., p.10, L.22–
p.11, L.2, p.29, L.2–p.32, L.10.) The district court reasoned that the lack of standing
resolved all issues raised in Mr. Mann’s motion to suppress. (Tr., p.36, Ls.15–20.) Thus,

As noted by the Court of Appeals in State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711 (Ct. App. 2006),
“[T]he word ‘standing’ is technically inaccurate.” Id. at 716 n.2. “Nevertheless, the term
is often employed as useful shorthand referring to whether the defendant had a privacy
interest in a place that was searched such that he or she is entitled to the exclusion of
the resulting incriminating evidence.” Id. The term “standing” will be used in this context
herein.

1
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the district court did not address whether the search of the rental car was lawful under
the Fourth Amendment. Then, after a brief recess, the district court reopened the matter
to determine whether the initial traffic stop was lawful. (Tr., p.37, L.17–p.63, L.23.) Idaho
State Police (“ISP”) Trooper Clark and Mr. Mann testified, and a video of the stop was
admitted into evidence. (Tr., p.40, L.7–p.60, L.4; State’s Ex. 1.) The district court found
Mr. Mann credible, but Trooper Clark “more credible” as to the purpose for the traffic
stop—Mr. Mann’s failure to signal for at least five seconds. (Tr., p.61, L.6–p.63, L.1.)
The district court then ruled the traffic stop was lawful because Trooper Clark had a
reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. (Tr., p.61, L.6–p.63, L.23.) The district court
entered on Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress “for the reasons stated on
the record.” (R., p.103.)
Mr. Mann proceeded to trial. (R., pp.143–167; see generally Tr., p.70, L.1–p.269,
L.20.) Trooper Clark testified that he found on the front passenger seat what he
believed to be a glass bong “with a burnt residue in one end” that smelled like “burnt
marijuana.” (Tr., p.118, Ls.7–17, p.120, Ls.6–23; see also State’s Ex. 2.) Trooper Clark
did not smell any burnt or raw marijuana while standing on the side of the road during
the traffic stop, however. (Tr., p.131, Ls.18–23.) Next to the bong, Trooper Clark also
found “a pipe cleaning tool, a small rubber container which seemed to have a residue or
resin inside, and a plastic bag with a brown-like substance in it.” (Tr., p.118, Ls.18–21.)
In the trunk, Trooper Clark found eight heat-sealed bags of marijuana. (Tr., p.122, Ls.5–
17 (Trooper Clark testimony), p.194, L.10–p.198, L.19 (ISP forensic scientist
testimony).) The State did not introduce any evidence that the residue found in the bong
was from an illegal substance.
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After the State submitted its case in chief, Mr. Mann moved pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 29 for acquittal on the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia.
(Tr., p.208, L.18–p.209, L.10.) He argued that the State must prove he intended to use
the bong in Idaho, and the State failed to present sufficient evidence of intent.
(Tr., p.208, L.18–p.209, L.10, p.211, Ls.2–17.) The State disagreed, arguing that it
presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of intent. (Tr., p.210, Ls.4–12.) The district
court denied Mr. Mann’s motion and ruled:
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 408 doesn’t mention anything about where
the defendant needs to intend to use the paraphernalia. The paraphernalia
has to be found in the state of Idaho, but the defendant need not intend to
use it here in the state of Idaho, and I think there is more than enough
circumstantial evidence . . . .
(Tr., p.212, Ls.13–18.) The defense rested shortly after this ruling. (Tr., p.213, L.20;
p.241, L.24.)
The district court instructed the jury. (Tr., p.215, L.1–p.226, L.4.) The jury
instruction for possession of drug paraphernalia, Instruction No. 12h, provided:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, the state must prove each of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

On or about 8th day of February, 2015
in the state of Idaho
the defendant JESSE EUGENE MANN possessed a bong or pipe,
intending
to use it to introduce into the human body a controlled substance.

If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant guilty.
(R., p.191; Tr., p.219, L.24–p.220, L.9 (Instruction No. 12h read to jury).) During closing
argument, Mr. Mann attempted to argue that there was no evidence he intended to use

4

the bong in Idaho. (Tr., p.248, L.12–p.249, L.11.) The State objected to Mr. Mann’s
argument, and the district court sustained the objection. (Tr., p.249, Ls.12–25.) After the
jury was sent out for deliberations, the district court reiterated that “where the defendant
intended to use the paraphernalia . . . was not relevant to this case” and “intent to use”
in Idaho was not an element of the offense. (Tr., p.258, L.19–p.259, L.1.)
During deliberations, the jury sent a question to the district court. The jury wrote:
Regarding
Instruction
12h
#3–4 “intending to use”
Does this matter:
1) defendant intended to use himself?
2) or use in Idaho? Or elsewhere
3) is there evidence of tested residue to indicate use?
Please provide the applicable law in writing.
(Aug. R., p.1 (capitalization and underline in original).) For the jury’s question 1, the
district court instructed the jury to “follow the jury instructions.” (Tr., p.264, Ls.1–4.) For
the jury’s question 3, the district court instructed the jury to “follow your recollection of
the evidence.” (Tr., p.264, Ls.5–8.) The district court wrote these instructions directly on
the jury’s question. (Aug. R., p.1.) For the jury’s question 2, the district court provided a
supplemental instruction to the jury:
Instruction No. 21
You are instructed that any possession of paraphernalia must occur
in Idaho.
If you find defendant possessed paraphernalia in Idaho, you must
consider whether the defendant intended to use the paraphernalia. It does
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not matter in which state the defendant formed the intent to use the
paraphernalia.
(R., p.202; Tr., p.264, Ls.9–18.) Mr. Mann objected to this instruction. (Tr., p.263, Ls.1–
7.) He argued that the instruction eliminated “any jurisdictional requirement that adds to
the crime.” (Tr., p.263, Ls.5–7.)
The jury returned a guilty verdict for trafficking in marijuana, driving without
privileges, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., p.203; Tr., p.265, L.9–p.266,
L.13.) For trafficking in marijuana, the district court sentenced Mr. Mann to the
mandatory minimum of three years fixed, plus four years indeterminate. (R., pp.210–11;
Tr., p.278, L.1–p.294, L.22 (sentencing hearing).) Mr. Mann filed a timely Notice of
Appeal from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.210–11, 217–19.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Mann’s motion to suppress?

II.

Did the district court err when it failed to instruct the jury that the State had to
prove Mr. Mann possessed the paraphernalia with the intent to use in Idaho?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Mann’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Mr. Mann asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress

based on its determination that he lacked standing to challenge the search of the rental
car. In State v. Cutler, 144 Idaho 272 (Ct. App. 2007), the Court of Appeals adopted a
totality of the circumstances test to determine whether an unauthorized driver has a
privacy interest in a rental car. Mr. Mann submits that the Court should modify the Cutler
test and adopt the approach from Judge Lansing’s concurring opinion. Alternatively, if
the Court reaffirms Cutler, Mr. Mann contends that the totality of the circumstances
establishes his privacy interest in the rental car.
B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a

motion to suppress. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014); State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho
584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013). The Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact “unless
they are clearly erroneous.” Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418. Findings of fact are clearly
erroneous if they are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v.
Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also Ellis, 155 Idaho at 587. “At a suppression
hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh
evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” Ellis, 155 Idaho at
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587. The Court exercises free review over the “application of constitutional principles in
light of those facts.” Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418.
C.

The District Court Erred When It Ruled Mr. Mann Did Not Have A Reasonable
Expectation Of Privacy In The Rental Car
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). “Article
I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that ‘[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.’” State v. Green, 158 Idaho
884, 886 (2015) (alteration in original). Under the United States and Idaho Constitutions,
“[w]arrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable . . . unless they
come within one of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 886–
87 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); State v. Henderson, 114
Idaho 293, 295 (1988)).
A threshold issue to challenge an unlawful search is standing. “A person
challenging a search has the burden of showing that he or she had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the item or place searched.” State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623,
626 (2008). The determination of a reasonable expectation of privacy involves a twopart inquiry: “(1) Did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of
the challenged search? and (2) Is society willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable?” Id.
In the rental car context, the Court of Appeals uses a totality of circumstances
test to determine whether an unauthorized driver has a reasonable expectation of

9

privacy in the car. Cutler, 144 Idaho at 275. The Court of Appeals rejected a bright-line
rule, such as the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit’s rule that an unauthorized driver never
has standing or the Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s rule that an unauthorized driver has
standing only if he can show that he had permission from the authorized driver. Id. at
274. Instead, the Court of Appeals adopted the test from the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2001). Cutler, 144 Idaho at 274–75. Like the
Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, the Sixth Circuit also had a general rule that an
unauthorized driver did not have standing. Smith, 263 F.3d at 586. But the Sixth Circuit
rejected the government’s argument that the rental agreement alone controls whether a
driver is authorized. Id. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that a “rigid test” was “inappropriate.”
Id. Looking at a number of factors, the Smith Court held that an unauthorized driver had
standing even though his use of the rental car was a breach of the rental agreement. Id.
at 586–87. The Court of Appeals in Cutler adopted the Sixth Circuit’s approach—
generally “unauthorized drivers lack standing,” but the totality of the circumstances can
overcome that presumption. 144 Idaho at 275–76.
1.

The Cutler Test Should Be Modified To Allow For An Unauthorized Driver
With The Lessee’s Permission To Maintain A Privacy Interest In The
Vehicle

In a concurring opinion in Cutler, Judge Lansing wrote in support of a test that
combines the Sixth Circuit’s totality of the circumstances test and the Eighth and Ninth
Circuit’s exception for an unauthorized driver with permission. Cutler, 144 Idaho at 276
(Lansing, J., concurring). Judge Lansing stated that an unauthorized driver’s permission
“from the lessee” or other “contractually authorized driver” would be sufficient to
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Id. Otherwise, the general
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rule

applies—the

unauthorized

driver

lacks

standing.

Id.

In

“extraordinary

circumstances,” however, Judge Lansing wrote that an unauthorized driver may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy “in the absence of direct permission.” Id. These
“extraordinary” circumstances persuaded Judge Lansing to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s
totality of the circumstances test with a “heavy burden” on the driver to show the
existence of other factors establishing a privacy interest. Id. Under Judge Lansing’s
approach, an unauthorized driver with either permission or other “rare” circumstances
could establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.
Mr. Mann submits that the Court should reconsider Cutler and adopt Judge
Lansing’s modified totality of the circumstances test. “Stare decisis requires that th[e]
Court follows controlling precedent unless that precedent is manifestly wrong, has
proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling that precedent is necessary to
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v.
Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4–5 (2015). The majority opinion and Judge Lansing’s
concurrence both start with the general presumption that “unauthorized drivers of rental
vehicles do not enjoy a legitimate expectation of privacy in such vehicles.” 144 Idaho at
275–76; id. at 276 (Lansing, J., concurring). Both allow this presumption to be overcome
by the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 275 (majority opinion); id. at 276 (Lansing, J.,
concurring). The majority’s test considers a number of factors, but not one factor is
dispositive. Id. at 275 (majority opinion). Judge Lansing’s test considers these factors as
well, but one particular factor if present—permission by lessee—is dispositive. Id. at 276
(Lansing, J., concurring). Mr. Mann submits that this test should control.
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Allowing an unauthorized driver to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy
with the lessee’s permission is consistent with the standing analysis for other non-owner
drivers. At its core, the question of standing rests on whether the person has a
possessory right or ownership interest in the vehicle. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 148 (1978) (search of vehicle did not violate Fourth Amendment rights of
passengers who asserted neither a property nor possessory interest in vehicle); State v.
Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 92 (1981) (defendant standing outside a parked car lacked
privacy interest when no evidence showed that he “owned or had a right to possess” the
car); State v. Foldesi, 131 Idaho 778, 780 (Ct. App. 1998). However, mere possession
or ownership alone is not determinative. Foldesi, 131 Idaho at 780–81; State v. Hanson,
142 Idaho 711 (Ct. App. 2006). As such, a non-owner cannot establish a privacy
interest in a vehicle by mere possession. Hanson, 142 Idaho at 719. But a non-owner’s
possession coupled with authorization from the owner or a person believed to have
authority is sufficient to confer standing. Id. The same principle should apply to lessees
and unauthorized drivers. Once the rental agreement is executed, the lessee becomes
the equivalent of the owner of the vehicle or, at the very least, a person believed to have
authority over the vehicle. Therefore, a non-owner’s possession, coupled with the
lessee’s authorization for the non-owner to use the vehicle, should be sufficient to
establish the non-owner’s privacy interest in the vehicle, even if the non-owner is an
unauthorized driver. See United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
In this case, there is no dispute that Mr. Mann had permission of the lessee to
drive the vehicle. Mr. Mann testified that his “living as married partner” of five years,
Ms. Cheney, knew he would be driving the rental vehicle. (Tr., p.10, L.22–p.11, L.9,
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p.11, Ls.16–18.) She helped him pack for the trip, filled up the car with gas, and gave
him the keys. (Tr., p.11, L.22–p.13, L.4.) She also knew of his travel destination.
(Tr., p.12, Ls.11–14.) Moreover, the State acknowledged that Mr. Mann had
Ms. Cheney’s permission. (Tr., p.26, Ls.20–21.) In light of the undisputed fact that
Mr. Mann had the lessee’s permission to drive the car, Mr. Mann asserts that he has
satisfied the modified Cutler test as set forth by Judge Lansing to establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the vehicle.
2.

In The Alternative, The Facts Are Sufficient For Mr. Mann To Establish A
Privacy Interest In The Rental Car Under Cutler’s Totality Of The
Circumstances Test

If the Court declines to adopt Judge Lansing’s approach, Mr. Mann asserts that
the facts of this case satisfy Cutler’s totality of the circumstances test.
As an initial matter, Mr. Mann asserts that the district court erroneously applied
the Cutler test by requiring he satisfy the same five factors used in Smith. When the
Court of Appeals adopted the Smith test, the Court of Appeals identified the five factors
specifically considered by the Sixth Circuit: 1) whether the defendant had a driver’s
license; (2) the relationship between the unauthorized driver and the lessee; (3) the
driver’s ability to present rental documents; (4) whether the driver had the lessee’s
permission to use the car; and (5) the driver’s relationship with the rental company.
Cutler, 144 Idaho at 275; Smith, 263 F.3d at 586–87. The Court of Appeals’ discussion
of the Smith factors, however, was not intended to require that each and every factor be
met to establish an expectation of privacy. That rigid application of the test would be
inconsistent with the Court of Appeals’ rationale for adopting the Sixth Circuit’s test. The
Court of Appeals reasoned, “Given the increasingly common utilization of rental vehicles
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for a myriad of purposes and our view that a bright line rule fails to address the ensuing
complexities, we are convinced the Sixth Circuit Court’s totality of the circumstances
approach best addresses the issue.” Cutler, 144 Idaho at 275. Thus, the Smith factors
only provide guidance, and the factors do not take precedence over other relevant facts
in the case. In this case, the district court examined the five factors and found that none
were satisfied except permission. (Tr., p.29, L.6–p.32, L.10.) Thus, the district court
concluded that “under the five Cutler factors the totality of the circumstances tilt in favor
of no standing.” (Tr., p.30, Ls.20–22.) Mr. Mann submits that the district court erred by
requiring that he satisfy each factor instead of examining the totality of the
circumstances.
Given all the facts here, the totality of the circumstances establishes that
Mr. Mann had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car. The most relevant
facts are Mr. Mann’s permission to drive the rental car and his marriage-like relationship
with Ms. Cheney. Mr. Mann and Ms. Cheney lived together for five years, and they have
one child together. (Tr., p.10, L.24–p.11, L.2, p.21, L.16–p.22, L.4.) They acted as a
married couple in all respects, such as (a) sharing all living expenses, (b) making all
parenting decisions together, (c) claiming Mr. Mann as a “dependent” on Ms. Cheney’s
health insurance, (d) having renter’s insurance together, and (e) claiming Mr. Mann
“under Ms. Cheney’s life insurance policy.” (Tr., p.18, L.12, p.19, L.11–p.21, L.15.)
Although they did not have a marriage certificate, Mr. Mann and Ms. Cheney’s
relationship was the equivalent of a marriage. Mr. Mann’s permission to drive the rental
car from his partner Ms. Cheney was sufficient to create a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the rental car.
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In light of the strength of the permission and relationship factors, Mr. Mann
submits that the remaining Smith factors carry little weight in the overall standing
analysis. First, Mr. Mann’s suspended license should not diminish his expectation of
privacy. Whether an unauthorized driver has a driver’s license should be afforded
minimal significance because drivers in general do not lose standing to challenge
unlawful searches simply for failing to have a driver’s license. See, e.g., Arizona v.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009) (determining legality of warrantless search of vehicle
when driver arrested for suspended license); State v. Stewart, 152 Idaho 868 (Ct. App.
2012) (determining legality of inventory search of vehicle when driver arrested for
suspended license). Second, the absence of evidence on Mr. Mann’s presentation of
rental documents or his relationship with rental car company is also minimally relevant.
Cf. United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 647 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding lessee with
possession and control of rental car had reasonable expectation of privacy even though
lease period had expired). These factors should be less significant when the
unauthorized driver has the lessee’s permission and an established relationship with the
lessee. Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court erred by
concluding Mr. Mann did not have standing to challenge the warrantless search of the
rental car.
Assuming Mr. Mann prevails on the standing issue on appeal, he submits that a
remand is necessary to resolve the other issues raised in his suppression motion.
Specifically, the district court did not address the constitutionality of the warrantless
search of the vehicle. Mr. Mann argued in his motion that the warrantless search could
not be justified as a search incident to arrest or an inventory search. (R., pp.51–55.) The
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State responded. (R., pp.94–94.) The district court did not rule on these issues or make
any necessary factual findings. (See Tr., p.29, L.2–p.36, L.23 (resolving the suppression
motion on standing grounds), p.37, L.17–p.39, L.21, p.61, L.6–p.63, L.23 (reopening the
matter to consider legality of traffic stop only). To determine if the warrantless search of
the vehicle was lawful—which the State has the burden to prove—Mr. Mann requests
that the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress be vacated and the case be
remanded for another suppression motion hearing.
II.
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Instruct The Jury That The State Had To
Prove Mr. Mann Possessed The Paraphernalia With The Intent To Use In Idaho
A.

Introduction
Mr. Mann submits that the district court’s supplemental jury Instruction No. 21 in

response to the jury’s question resulted in the incorrect legal instruction on the requisite
mental state for possession of drug paraphernalia, a specific intent crime. Instruction
No. 21 informed the jury that possession of the paraphernalia in Idaho mattered, but the
jurisdiction in which the defendant formed the intent to use the paraphernalia was not of
legal significance. This instruction is incomplete and misleading. By instructing the jury
that the formation of intent was irrelevant, Instruction No. 21 failed to properly answer
the jury’s question as to the specific intent element of the offense and incorrectly
instructed the jury as a matter of law. The State cannot show that this error was
harmless. As such, Mr. Mann’s conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia should
be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.
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B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which

this Court exercises free review.” State v. Hopkins, 158 Idaho 191, 195–96 (Ct. App.
2015) (quoting State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009)). The Court reviews “jury
instructions as a whole because ‘[i]t is well established that [an] instruction may not be
judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as
a whole and the trial record.’” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 472 (2012) (alteration in
original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991)).
When a defendant has objected to an instruction, [the Court] will
apply the harmless error test articulated in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
227 (2010). Typically, under the harmless error test, once the defendant
shows that a constitutional violation occurred, the State has the burden of
demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation did not
contribute to the jury’s verdict. Id. If the jury reached its verdict based on
an erroneous instruction, [the Court] will generally vacate and remand for
a new trial. Id. at 228. However, where the jury received proper instruction
on all but one element of an offense, and where the Court “concludes
beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and
supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would
have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly
found to be harmless.” Id. (quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 79, 90
P.3d 298, 304 (2004).
Id.
C.

The District Court Improperly Instructed The Jury By Eliminating An Essential
Element Of The Offense
Idaho Code § 37-2734A provides: “It is unlawful for any person to use, or to

possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow,
harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze,
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into
the human body a controlled substance.” I.C. § 37-2734A(1) (emphasis added).
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Possession of drug paraphernalia is a specific intent crime. State v. Williams, 134 Idaho
590, 592 (Ct. App. 2000). “[A] specific intent requirement refers to that state of mind
which in part defines the crime and is an element thereof.” State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924,
926 (1993) (quoting State v. Gowin, 97 Idaho 766, 768 (1976)). “Specific intent means a
special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required
with respect to the actus reus of the crime.” State v. Lopez, 126 Idaho 831, 833–34
(Ct. App. 1995) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In contrast, “[a] general criminal
intent requirement is satisfied if it is shown that the defendant knowingly performed the
proscribed acts.” Fox, 124 Idaho at 183 (quoting Gowin, 97 Idaho at 767–68). As a
specific intent crime, to establish a defendant’s guilt of possession of drug
paraphernalia, the State must prove not only that the defendant possessed the item in
question, but also that he intended to use it to introduce a controlled substance into the
human body.2 Williams, 134 Idaho at 592.
“In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of
act and intent, or criminal negligence.” I.C. § 18-114. “A union of act and intent jury
instruction should generally be given for a general-intent crime.” State v. Beeks, 159
Idaho 223, 231 (Ct. App. 2015). A defendant is not entitled to a union of act and intent
instruction for a specific intent crime, however. State v. Hoffman, 137 Idaho 897, 900

2

For example, in Williams, the Court of Appeals stated:
The information charged that Williams “did possess with the intent to use
drug paraphernalia, to wit: a spoon to prepare a controlled substance for
intravenous use.” Thus, in order to establish Williams’ guilt of this offense,
the State was required to prove not only that he possessed the small
spoon in question but that he had intended to use it to prepare a controlled
substance for intravenous introduction into the human body.
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(Ct. App. 2002). A union of act and intent instruction is unnecessary for a specific intent
crime where the jury is properly instructed on “the specific mental states required for the
commission of these offenses.” Id. In other words, a union of act and intent is required

134 Idaho at 592.
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for all offenses, but, if the jury is properly instructed on the “requisite mental elements”
of a specific intent crime, a union of act and intent instruction is duplicative and
superfluous.
Here, Mr. Mann asserts that Instruction No. 21 improperly instructed the jury on
the specific mental state required for possession of drug paraphernalia. The jury asked
the district court if “intending to use” meant “use in Idaho” or “elsewhere.” (Aug. R., p.1.)
The first two sentences of Instruction No. 21 are correct: (1) the possession of
paraphernalia must occur in Idaho and (2) the defendant must intend to use the
paraphernalia. (R., p.202.) But the third sentence—“It does not matter in which state the
defendant formed the intent to use the paraphernalia”—is improper as a matter of law.
(R., p.202.)
Instruction No. 21 is improper because it failed to answer the jury’s question and
confused the elements of the offense. The instruction refers to the formation of intent,
but the formation of intent is not an element of the offense. This reference to “where the
defendant formed the intent” is misleading. As a specific intent crime, what matters is
whether the defendant had the intent to use the alleged paraphernalia to introduce a
controlled substance into the human body in the jurisdiction in which he possessed the
paraphernalia. In other words, the essential elements of the offense are satisfied by the
act of possession joined with present intent to use in Idaho. See I.C. § 18-114 (requiring
a union of act and intent for all crimes); see also State v. Dietrich, 135 Idaho 870, 872
(Ct. App. 2001) (“In a criminal prosecution, the State must prove subject matter
jurisdiction by showing that an essential element of the offense occurred within Idaho.”).
The district court should have referred the jury to the original instruction on possession

20

of drug paraphernalia, R., p.191, or simply reiterated that State must prove Mr. Mann
had the intent to use the bong in Idaho to introduce a controlled substance into the
body. By referring to the formation of intent, and not the present intent to use in Idaho,
Instruction No. 21 erroneously signaled to the jury that a determination of the requisite
mental state at the time of the criminal act did not matter. Thus, Instruction No. 21
improperly instructed the jury on the specific mental state required for possession of
drug paraphernalia.
“An erroneous instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove an
element of a charged crime can be characterized as either a violation of due process, or
as a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee.” State v. Parsons, 153
Idaho 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999);
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277–78 (1993); State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576,
588 (2011); State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749 (2007)). Here, Instruction No. 21
relieved the State of its burden to prove specific intent, and Mr. Mann objected to the
instruction. (Tr., p.263, Ls.1–7.) The burden then shifts to the State to establish
harmlessness. Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 472. Mr. Mann asserts that the State cannot meet
this burden. The erroneous mental state element was neither “uncontested” nor
“supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the
same absent the error.” Id. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that the jury was not
convinced by State’s evidence of intent in light of its questions to the district court. (Aug.
R., p.1.) Because the jury reached its verdict based on an erroneous instruction,
Mr. Mann submits that his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia should be
vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Mann respectfully requests that the Court vacate the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress and remand the case for further proceedings on his
motion to suppress, including a determination of whether the search of the rental car
was lawful. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that the Court vacate his judgment of
conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia and remand the case for a new trial.
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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